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Comments welcomeAN EMPIRICAL TEST OF HOLMSTRLiM'S PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL THAT TAKES TAX AND
SIGNALLING HYPOTHESES EXPLICITLY INTO ACCOUNT
Harry Barkema~
Abstract
During the last two decades, economists have grown increasingly inte-
rested in the theory of the firm. Much interest has focused on the econo-
mics of bonus schemes in a principal-agent setting. However the empirical
validity of this theory is not well established. A number of studies have
documented evidence that is consistent with this theory. However this
evidence is also consistent with tax and signalling hypotheses.
In this paper I test two hypotheses that are both derived from
Holmstrtim's 19~9 'standard' principal-agent model: that a reciprocal rela-
tion exists between the agents' expected bonus and effort; 2) that agents
for whom performance variables are available with higher signal-to-noise
ratio's, earn higher bonuses associated with these variables. The agency
hypotheses are tested against data about managers of high technology firms
in the Netherlands. An empirical model is tested that takes simultanously
and separately into account effects suggested by tax and signalling hypo-
theses. The agency hypotheses are corroborated by the data.
i The author gratefully acknowledges comments by Ray Ball, Jim Brickley
and Ross Watts on an earlier version of this paper, as well as financial
support from NWO.1.
1. Introduction
During the last two decades, economists have grown increasingly inte-
rested in the theory of the firm. Much of the interest has focused on the
economics of bonus schemes in a principal-agent setting (Ross, 19~3,
Harris and Raviv, 19~6, 19~8, Holmstr~m, 1979, 1982, etc.). Until now,
however, the empirical validity of this theory has not been well esta-
blished.
The theory implies that agents are motivated by their bonuses, and
that bonuses are based on the agents' effort. Some studies have documented
evidence that is consistent with these hypotheses.~ This evidence is,
however, also consistent with tax and signalling hypotheses, hence it
cannot unambiguously be attributed to agency hypotheses (Miller and
Scholes, 1982, Warner, 1985, Raviv, 1985, Brickley, Bhagat and Lease,
1985, and Bhagat, Brickley and Lease, 1985).
Additionally, in practice bonus schemes seem less important than one
might have believed given the abundant literature on this subject. Annusl
changes in the value of shares owned by top managers tend to be much lar-
ger than the value of the change in even their salary and bonus combined
(Benston, 1985, Murphy, 1985, Jensen and Murphy, 1988).2 Also the labour
market, where promotions substantially increase the manager's salary and
status, is likely to be a major source of incentives.3 Finally, in the
world 'as we know it' (in the words of Frank Knight) a large portion of
managerial income seems to be, at least in the short run, independent of
performance. Egalitarian pay systems, seniority based pay systems and
holiday bonuses abound (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988), in the U.S. and
even more so in Europe and Japan. Because bonuses seem to be relatively
unimportant in practice, and because bonus schemes and their documented
effects can also be explained by tax and signalling hypotheses, the ques-
tion arises whether the principal-agent theory on bonus schemes has any
empirical validity at all.
It is the purpose of this study to test for this validity such that
tax and signalling effects are explicitly controlled. Two hypotheses are
tested that are both derived from Holmstr~m's 19~9 'standard' principal-
agent model: 1) that a reciprocal relation exists between the agent's
expected bonus and effort; 2) that agents for whom performance variables2.
are available with higher signal-to-noise ratio's, face higher bonuses
associated with these variables. The hypotheses are tested against data
about top level managers of high-technology firms in the Netherlands. An
empirical model (a system of equations) is tested that takes simultanously
and separately into account effects suggested by agency hypotheses and
effects suggested by tax and signalling hypotheses. It is found that even
if tax and signalling effects are statistically controlled, agency hypo-
theses are still corroborated by the data.
This study is organized as follows. The agency hypotheses are dis-
cussed in section 2. The data set is discussed in section 3, and a simple
test that reveals evidence consistent with the agency hypotheses is pre-
sented in section 4. In section 5 it is shown that tax and signalling
hypotheses can also explain the documented results. The test that sepa-
rates agency effects from tax and signalling effects is presented in sec-
tion 6. The paper ends with a summary and some suggestions for further
research.
2. The agency hypotheses
Suppose a publicly owned firm with e board of directors and multiple
managers.4 5 The board is assumed to be sufficiently motivated to select a
value maximizing pay package for managers. Board members may be motivated
because they own shares of the firm, because of proxy fights or takeover
threats (possibly resulting in a removal of incumbent directors), or be-
cause their performance as a director affects their reputatíon and hence
their income in other occupations: as a director or as a manager at an-
other firm (Manne, 1965, Fama, 1980, Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b, Jensen and
Ruback, 1983).
The board is assumed to administer bonuses to managers based on two
6
performance variables: 1) the firm's accounting earnings; 2) the mana-
ger's effort as monitored by the board. Holmstrtim's 1979 'standard' agency
model provídes a framework for evaluating properties of any two generic
variables that are relevant for the evaluation of an agent's perfor-
mance.~ If some additional constraints are placed on the utility function
of the manager and on the probability functions (see Lambert and Larcker,3.
~98~) , it can be derived that the bonus is an increasing function of the
signal-to-noise ratio's d and d of the performance variables 'accounting
a m
earnings' and 'managerial effort as monitored by the board', where:
d- s(a~e) ~ var(a~e), and d- s(mJe) ~ var (m~e),
a m
s(.Je) is the conditional sensitivity of the mean of the signal to the
manager's effort and var (.~e) is the variance of the signal given the
manager's effort, that is: its noise.
Now suppose a manager about whose effort information is more readily
available and monitoring reveals less noisy information than in case of
other managers, that is, a manager with a relatively high d. Examples
m
seem marketing managers and sales managers, whose effort may immediately
be reflected by advertisement campaigns, changes in the mai~ket share of a
product, and so on. On the other hand, information about effort seems less
readily available in case of e.g. RB~D managers, since the value of re-
search activities may become clear only (many) years later, or in case of
personnel managers, whose effort to maintain and increase the quality of
the labour force is even hard to measure in a long term context. Since
marketing managers and sales managers are expected to have relatively high
d's, we expect relatively high bonuses for these managers.
m
A second implication from Holmstrt5m's model concerns the reciprocal
relation between the agent's effort and his expected bonus. On the one
hand, a higher level of effort is predicted to lead to a higher expected
bonus. On the other hand, higher expected bonuses are predicted to induce
higher levels of effort. The latter implication, combined with the earlier
derived prediction that marketing and sales managers face relatively high
expected bonuses, leads to the prediction that these managers select rela-
tively high levels of effort.
The hypotheses about variations in bonuses and effort across managers
allow For a test of HolmstrSm's principal-agent model in the next section.
Apart from that, the hypotheses are also interesting in their own right.
Theory about how bonuses and effort vary across functional managers within
firms complements theory derived elsewhere that explains how pay packages
vary across hierarchical levels (Smith and Watts, ~982) and across firms
(Lewellen and Loderer and Martin, 1987, Lambert end Larcker, 198~).4.
3. The data set
Data were obtained from a survey among top level managers in the high
technology sector, held in the Netherlands in 1984 (Dijkstra, 1985).8 The
data concern managers at the two highest levels of their firms. The fol-
lowing types of jobs were distinguished in the survey: general management,
marketing, finance and administration, personnel, sutomatization, educa-
tion and training, production, research and development, sales, purchases,
and technical services.
The survey was carried out by means of questionnaires, with a follow-
up by telephone if questionnaires were not returned ín time. Eventually,
248 managers responded from 50 firms, which accounts for 20z of the number
of firms approached. Since the non-response rate is quite high (80 X),
tests were carried out to check for response bias, e.g. a chi-square test
was carried out with respect to the types of industries that responded,
such as electro-technical firms, computer firms, chemical firms, engi-
neering firms, and so on. No significant score was found. Nevertheless
empirical results that are derived from this data set should be inter-
preted with care.
4. A simple test of the agency hypotheses
In this section a simple test is performed with respect to the pre-
dicted variations in bonus and effort across management functions. More
specifically, marketing managers are compared to other managers at the
same hierarchical level. The analysis of a rather homogenous group: marke-
ting managers, allows later on in this study the identification and sub-
sequent statistical control of other hypotheses that may also explain the
bonuses and levels of effort documented in the present section, apart from
tax and signalling hypotheses.9
Given the data acquired by the survey, the theoretical variable 'ef-
fort' is operationalized in a simple way: by the number of hours devoted
to work per week. (Later I will deal explicitly with flaws of this indica-
tor.) The bonus is defined in the survey in terms of the manager's bonus5.
dependent on past year's performance, measured at the corporate, divisio-
nal or the individual level.
For 'marketing managers' and 'other managers' (that is: other managers
than marketing managers at the hierarchical level directly below general
management), the mean bonus and the mean number of hours devoted to work
per week are presented in the first two colums of table l.lo
marketing other
managers managers mark.-other t-value
bonus 19.6 5.7 13.9 2.8~~
hours
.
49.2 46.1 3.1 2.0
Table 2. Sample statistics about managers in the high technology sector.
Bonuses in thousands of Dfl.
w : significant at 0.05 level (one-sided test)
~~ . „ 0.01 „
The third column reports differences in the bonus and hours of work
between marketing managers and other managers. In the fourth column, the
t-values of these differences are given. Because the distribution of vari-
ables deviates from normality, standard deviations (on which the t-values
are based) were calculated by means of Jackknifing. This procedure usually
yields estimators that approximate Student's t-distribution (Gray and
Schucany, 19~2, Mosteller and Tukey, 19~~).
The following conclusions can be drawn from the table. Marketing mana-
gers earn significantly higher bonuses than other managers (t - 2.8).
Additionally, marketing managers devote significantly more hours per week
to work (t - 2.0). Both results are consistent with the agency hypotheses
formulated earlier.6.
We end this section with a possible criticism against the test pre-
sented above. (Other criticisms are dealt with later in the study).
Lewellen, Loderer and Martin (1987) and Lambert and Larcker (1987) predict
variations in compensation schemes across firms and industries. Now al-
though 'high technology' indicates some homogeneity in terms of firms and
industries, it still entails electro-technical firms, computer firms,
chemical firms, engineering firms, and so on (see section 3). This diver-
sity, combined with the rather high non-response rate of the survey, could
in theory have a disturbing effect on the empirical results presented
above. The following example illustrates the point. Suppose marketing
managers from an industry that is dominated by large firms are overrepre-
sented in the sample. Suppose also that larger gains result from motiva-
ting a manager of a larger firm than of a smaller firm. In that case,
higher bonuses are expected for marketing managers.
Therefore, as a check, means were recalculated for a more homogeneous
sample that only contained computer firms and electro-technical firms.
Only very small changes in sample statistics were found for the remaining
marketing managers (26) and other managers (105): mean bonuses turned out
to be 21.9 and 6.5, and hours devoted to work 50.1 and 47.4, respect-
ively.lt
5. Tax and signalling hypotheses that could also explain the documented
results
The empirical regularities documented in the previous section are
consistent with the agency hypotheses formulated earlier. However, as I
will show below, other non-mutually exclusive hypotheses are also consis-
tent with the documented evidence: a tax hypothesis and a signalling hypo-
thesis. Moreover, the higher bonuses and levels of effort of marketing
managers could be explained based on job specific characteristics.
5.1. A signalling hypothesis.
A signalling hypothesis assumes that managers, even if they select
first best levels of effort, may possess inside information or 'good news'7.
that they want to signal to the market. One way to convince the market of
the truth of the signal, is by adopting incentive schemes that reward the
manager in case the good news is true. To give an example: a manager may
accept restricted stock of the firm in which he is employed, thus signal-
ling to the market that he expects a favorable outcome of investment pro-
jects (Leland and Pyle, 1977). Also, if the debt capacity of a firm is a
signal of its health, the manager may accept a scheme that rewards him for
debt increases, and (severely) punishes him in case the debt forces the
firm into bankruptcy (Ross, 1977).
As a result the documented positive reaction of shareholders on the
adoption of executive compensation plans (Brickley, Bhagat and Lease,
1985, Tehranian and Waegelein, 1985) and the resulting existence of a
relation between executive compensation and firm performance (Larcker,
1983, Murphy, 1985, Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985, Benston, 1985, Jensen and
Murphy, 1988) can also be explained in terms of signalling hypotheses. The
evidence does not necessarily support the agency hypotheses.
At first sight, the evidence documented in the previous section ap-
pears less vulnerable to this criticism. Although the signalling hypothe-
sis is capable of explaining the adoption and existence of schemes that
award a bonus to the manager, it is not immediately obvious that the hypo-
thesis can explain the documented variations in bonuses across managers.
However assume that marketing managers earn higher reservation wages
than other managers. Earlier it was assumed that the utility functions of
managers belong to the power class of utility functions (that exhibit
decreasing absolute risk aversion and constant proportional risk aver-
sion). The two assumptions combined imply that cet. par. less disutility
is induced by a risky bonus on marketing managers. As a result it is ex-
pected to be cheaper to signal by means of marketing managers, which may
explain their higher bonuses.
In fact the mean total income of marketing managers and 'other mana-
gers' of computer and electro-technical firms (the more homogenous sample)
turn out to be f 138.700,- and f 99.100,- respectively. This is consistent
with the assumption that marketing managers earn higher reservation wages
than other managers and hence with the signalling hypothesis formulated
above.8.
According to Raviv a signalling hypothesis is especially relevant in
the high technology sector: 'It could well be that different hypotheses
are applicable in different environments. For example, when we discuss
high technology firms it can be conjectured that information signalling is
crucial in designing the entrepreneur's contract. In other environments
the motivation of workers might be the dominant reason for a compensation-
incentive contract.' (Raviv, 1985)-
To sum up: the criticism to previous empirical studies on compensation
schemes that observed regularities cannot only be explained in terms of
agency hypotheses but also in terms of signalling hypotheses, applies also
to the documented results of the previous section. Additional testing is
therefore required that separates signalling effects from agency effects.
This test is performed in section 6.
5.2. A tax hypothesis.
In their 1982 article, Miller and Scholes seek 'to distinguish schemes
that seem intended maínly to share tax benefits from those, of greater
interest to economists, that appear designed as incentives to make the
real pie bigger'. They show that under the US tax system a variety of
schemes, including various types of stock (restricted stock, phantom
stock, performance shares), options (option stock, appreciation rights,
stock purchase plans} and bonus plans are tax-advantageous. Hence the
existence of these schemes cannot unambiguously be attributed to agency
effects.
In the Netherlands, a different setting applies. To give an example:
the personal tax rate on capital gains is zero. Nevertheless, as I will
show below, a tax hypothesis cannot a priori be excluded as an explanation
of the documented variations in bonuses.
Compare the following one-period settings A and B. In both settings
the manager is entitled to a salary at the beginning of the period, of
which he does not consume an amount v during the period. The personal and
corporate tax rate are denoted by t and t, respectively.
p c
A) the manager obtains v at the beginning of the period with the rest of
his salary. The manager invests what is left of v after taxes in riskless9.
securities with interest rate r. If interest is tax exempt, the investment
amounts at the end of the period to:
v(1 - t )(1 t r) (1)
p
Additional v yields at the end of the period:
v(1 - t){1 t r(1 - t)}
D D
(2)
B) During the period the firm invests v in riskless securities, and pays v
and interest to the manager at the end of the period, after a deduction
that compensates the firm for the corporate tax increase due to the ín-
terest obtained. The payment is labeled 'bonus'.~ZThe manager obtains at
the end of the period:
v{1 t r(1 - t)}(1 - t)
c p (3)
Let us compare the settings. In essence, the difference lies in the
tax paid over interest during the period: 0, t and t under (1), (2) and
D c
(3), respectively. Hence (1) dominates (2) and (3) if t, t ~ 0. That is,
p c
as long as interest is tax-exempt, and the personal and corporate tax rate
are positive, the manager prefers v with his salary. F~rthermore, (3)
dominates (2) if t( t. Thus if the tax-exempt amount is exhausted and c p
the personal tax rate is higher than the corporate tax rate, the manager
prefers a bonus.
In 1984 dutch managers typically faced a personal tax rate of 0.6~ or
0.~2 13, while interest was tax exempt up to f 1200.-. Hence if t- 0.6~
D
and r- 0.05, a manager prefers v up to f ~2.000,- in the form of sala-
ry.l~~ Since the 1984 corporate tax rate was 0.43, which is lower than the
typical personal tax rate, managers prefer additional amounts of v in the
form of a bonus.
Earlier I found that marketing managers earn on average higher total
incomes than other managers. As a result, cet. par. (given equal amounts
of consumption during the manager's working life, etc.), marketing mana-
gers are expected to defer more income, that is, to earn higher bonuses.10.
Thus a tax hypothesis cannot a priori be excluded as an explanation of the
variations in bonuses documented earlier.
While a tax hypothesis cannot be excluded, some doubt can be raised
about whether tax benefits are the sole explanation of bonus differen-
tials:
A) Tax benefits from scheme ( 3) are small. In case of the average marke-
ting manager, annual gains from deferring income are at best (3) -(2):
v{1 f r(1 - t)}(1 - t)- v(1 - t){1 t r(1 - t)} -
~ D D D
19200{1 t 0.05(~ - 0.43)}(1 - 0.67) - 19200(1 - 0.67){1 t o.o5(i - 0.67)}
-,p8o,-
For most other managers these gains are even smaller. These tax benefits
are possibly smaller than the transaction costs of establishing an ad-
ministering a bonus plan, and may thus be insufficient to explain dutch
bonus plans in general and variations in bonuses in particular.
B) Gains from bonus plans arise because taxes are foregone for one year.
However, at least in theory, larger gains may be reaped under alternative
plans such as pension plans that defer payments for longer periods.
C) In practice a bonus is often paid if accounting earnings surpass a
prepecified criterion. Miller and Scholes argue that this plan is essen-
tially equsl to options on e hypothetical common stock with pay-offs cor-
responding to the firm's accounting earnings. This plan is more attractive
than a straight salary for a manager who invests savings in traded or
home-made options, because under the plan any price appreciation of the
hypothetical options over the exercise period is tax-exempt (Miller and
Scholes, ~982). In the Netherlands, however, taxes on price appreciations
are zero. Hence the Miller and Scholes 'tax-story' does not explain the
existence of dutch plans that award a bonus conditional on accounting
earnings.l'
Thus it seems doubtful that the tax hypothesis is the sole explanation
oF the documented bonus differentials. Nevertheless a tax hypothesis can-
not completely be excluded on theoretical grounds alone. Therefore, an11.
empirical test that separates agency effects from tax effects is carried
out in paragraph 6.
I end this section with the following expansions of the analysis.
Suppose the opportunity set of the firm and the manager is expanded such
that they are also allowed to invest in stock. Since capital gains are
tax-exempt for dutch managers, the firm cannot reap tax benefits by reali-
zing capital gains in stead of the manager.1ó 1~ On the other hand, since
dividends are taxed in the Netherlands at the personal tax rate with a
tax-exempt amount (similar to interest), tax benefits can be reaped if the
firm invests in stock and pays dividend to managers in the form of a bo-
nus, after a deduction that compensates the firm for the corporate tax
increase due to the dividend obtained.18 Hence the fact that firms often
own shares of other firms may (partly) be explained by a tax gimmick:
bonus plans.
Furthermore, given the opportunity to reap tax benefits associated
with dividends, the following clientele-effect is predicted. Firms will
invest in high dividend, low capital gain stock, and pass this dividend on
to managers at the corporate tax rate in the form of bonuses. Managers, on
the other hand, who face a high personal tax rate, will specialize in low
dividend, high capital gain stock. This frequency distribution of investor
preferences will in turn attract a distribution of corporate payout ra-
tios. Vice versa, each corporation will attract a clientele consisting of
those preferring its particular payout ratio. In sum: bonus plans as tax
gimmicks will induce a specialization in corporate payout ratios (a clien-
tele effect).~9
5.3- Two other hypotheses that may also explain the documented results.
Suppose the earlier hypothesized reciprocal relation between expected
bonus and effort does apply, but not the signal-to-noise hypothesis on the
basis of which I predicted higher bonuses for marketing manaqers. ThPn
higher bonuses for marketing managers can nevertheless be predicted. Since
marketing managers earn higher reservation wages (as mentioned above),
less disutility is associated with subjecting these managers to risk,
hence in equilibrium these managers are exptected to face higher expected12.
bonuses, associated with higher levels of effort. Hence the higher bonuses
and hours of work of marketing managers do not necessarily corroborate the
signal-to-noise hypothesis.
Finally, suppose the variable 'effort' is imperfectly operationalized
by the variable 'hours of work'. Suppose, more specifically, that because
marketing (and sales) managers 'have to' travel much outside normal wor-
king hours in order to attract clients, many nights 'have to' be spent in
hotels, and so on, the reported number of hours of work is biased upwards
in case of these managers. In that case, more hours of work are expected
in case of marketing managers even if the agency hypotheses do not apply.
In the next section these two explanations will also be taken expli-
citly into account into the empirical tests.
6. A more sophisticated test of the agency hypotheses
In this section I present a more sophisticated test of the agency
hypotheses that takes the non-mutually exclusive hypotheses presented in
the previous section explicitly into account. An empirical model is speci-
fied and estimated that separates effects suggested by agency hypotheses
from effects suggested by hypotheses of the previous section. The empiri-
cal model is tested against data about managers of computer firms and
electro-technical firms.
I) Suppose the signalling hypothesis applies. Then it is expected to be
cheaper to signal by means of marketing managers with higher reservation
wages since less disutility is associated with risk than in case of other
managers. This hypothesis is modelled in figure 1 as follows. In the fi-
gure 'type of manager' is a dummy variable, valued 1 in case of a
marketing manager and 0 otherwise. The expectation that marketing managers
earn higher incomes is captured by the positive effect from 'type of
manager' on 'total income'. The hypothesis that higher incomes lead to
higher bonuses is captured by the positive effect from 'total income' on







Figure 1. An empirical model that separates agency effects from other
effects.
II) Suppose the tax hypothesis applies. Then I expect that marketing mana-
gers, due to higher incomes, defer more income to enjoy tax benefits. The
first part of this hypothesis: that marketing managers earn higher in-
comes, is (also) captured by the effect from 'type of manager' on 'total
income'. The second part: that managers with higher íncomes defer more
income, is (also) captured by the effect from 'total income' on 'bonus'.
III) Suppose the reciprocal relation between expected bonus and effort
applíes but not the signal-to-noise hypothesis. Then again higher bonuses
of marketing managers are expected due to their higher incomes. This is
the third hypothesis covered by the effect fro~n 'type of manager' via
'total income' on 'bonus'. (Later I wíll deal with problems due to imper-
fections in the operationalization of effort.)
After these other, non-mutually exclusive hypotheses have been expli-
citly taken into account into the model, I still expect, based on the
signal-to-noise hypothesis, that marketing managers earn higher bonuses.
This hypothesis is modelled by the positive direct effect from 'type of
manager' on 'bonus'. Furthermore, I expect a reciprocal relation between
expected bonuses and effort. This relation is modelled by the reciprocal
relation between 'bonus' and 'hours of work'.
( f ) ` , ( t )
~~14.
The model of figure 1 was estimated by means of LISREL, a flexible
framework for econometric analysis. LISREL allows e.g. the simultanous
estimation of multiple equations, hence reciprocal relations can explicit-
ly be taken into account (JtSreskog and SZSrbom, 1981, JtSreskog and Wold,
1981, Barkema and Folmer, 1982, 1983, see also Lambert and Larcker, 1987).
The model of figure 1 is represented in equation (4), where y1 - total
income; yz - the bonus; y3 - hours of work; xl - type of manager; bí~ -
the effect of variable y~ on variable y1; gi~ - the effect from variable
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The model represented in (4) was estimated by means of the Unweighted
Least Squares (ULS)-procedure. This procedure does not require distribu-
tional assumptions about variables. The estimates are presented in table
coefficient
estimate
bzi b3z bs grr gzi
0.48 0.27 0.20 0.38 0.15
Table 2. LISREL-estimates of the model of (4).
For ease of exposition, the estimates of table 2 are presented in figure 2
in a format similar to figure 1. T-values were calculated by means oF


















The following conclusions can be drawn from figure 2. Consistent with
earlier findings, It is found that marketing managers earn significantly
higher incomes than other managers at the same management level (t -
~.50). In line with the higher total incomes, marketing managers earn
significantly higher bonuses (t - 10.03). The last result is consistent
with at least one of the 'alternatíve' hypotheses derived earlier (a tax
hypothesis, a signalling hypothesis, and so on).
However even if effects suggested by these hypotheses are statistical-
ly controlled, marketing managers still earn significantly higher bonuses
than other managers (t - 2.85), which corroborates the signal-to-noise
hypothesis. In addition, both effects from 'bonus' on 'hours of work' and
from 'hours of work' on 'bonus' are significant (t - 3.66 and t- 2.65),
which corroborates the hypothesized reciprocal relation between expected
bonus and effort.
Also other models could be tested, e.g. that check for operationaliza-
tion errors (e.g. the operationalization of effort by means of 'hours of
work'), or that explicitly recognize a reciprocal relation between 'bonus
income' and 'total income'. Additional tests reveal that the explicit
treatment of these aspects in empirical models strenghtens rather than
weakens the conclusions formulated above.zl16.
~. Summary and conclusions
In this paper I tested two implications from Holmstrdm's 'standard'
19~9 príncipal-agent model: 1) that a reciprocal relation exists between
the agents' expected bonus and effort; 2) that agents for whom performance
variables are available with higher signal-to-noise ratio's, earn higher
bonuses associated with these variables. Hypotheses were tested against
data about managers from high-technology firms in the Netherlands. It was
found that even if tax and signalling effects are statistically control-
led, the agency hypotheses are still corroborated by the data.
The hypotheses derived and tested in this paper about variations in
bonuses and effort across managers are also interesting in themselves. The
explanation of the complex pattern of compensation schemes within firms
and the various managerial decisions induced by these contracts, provides
an important challenge to economists interested in developing the theory
of the firm.
Furthermore, more work needs to be done to test various implications
of principal-agent theory. In this respect more ingenuity might be shown
than using traditional techniques and data sets of the theory of finance
(such as event studies and COMPUSTAT, respectively, see the empirícal
studies mentioned earlier); e.g. because data sets that are appropriate
for testing hypotheses about capital markets are not necessarily the best
to test implications about individual compensation schemes and behaviour.
In my opinion, the extra costs in terms of time and money needed to ac-
quire alternative data will often be justified by the gains in terms of
decreased ambiguity of test results, e.g. because (some) specification
errors associated with tax and signalling effects are avoided. Also, more
relevant data sets may exist 'out there', e.g. gathered by consultancy
firms, than is generally known by researchers in agency theory.
Finally, in addition to tests against US data, gains may be associated
with the use of non-US data. First, because it may broaden the empirical
base of agency theory. Secondly, because in economics laboratory experi-
ments are of limited use, experiments by 'Nature', such as variations in
institutional settings over time and over space and the consequences of
these variations, provide a rich source of data. Especially the latter
type of variations (across space, e.g. across countries) has hardly been17.
exploited until now in testing implications of agency theory about compen-
sation schemes and associated behaviour.18.
Footnotes
1. Larcker (1983) documents a positive relation between performance plan
adoption and corporate capital investment, Murphy (1985), Coughlan and
Schmidt (1985), Benston (1985), and Jensen and Murphy (1988) find that
executive compensation correlates positively with corporate perfor-
mance, Tehranian and Waegelein (1985), and Brickley, Bhagat and Lease
(1985) measure positive abnormal stock returns after the announcement
of the adoption of short and long term executive compensation plans.
2. Jensen and Murphy (1988) find that the median CEO of Fortune top 500
manufacturing firms faces a change in all pay and stock related wealth
of 197.6 cents per 1000 dollars of change in shareholder wealth. Of
these 197.6 cents, 160.5 cents are a change in wealth related to stock
ownership, 14.5 cents a change in the value of stock options and 23.1
cents a change in total compensation and the present value of the
change in salary and bonus. Of these 23.1 cents, only 2.0 cents is a
change in this year's and next year's salary and bonus.
3. Murphy (1985) reports that promotions of U.S. top managers tend to
increase their total salary by 7.7 X - 42.9 x annually. These promo-
tions typically represent systematic increases in salary, contrary to
bonuses that tend to be incidental.
4. A board may exist (that is, enhance firm value) if costs are asso-
ciated with the specification and enforcement of contracts between
shareholders and managers. Shareholders could also motivate managers
by means oF e.g. restricted stock. However in that case a paretean
improvement may result from the installation of a board that monitors
managerial effort and administers rewards accordingly (see Jensen and
Meckling, 1986, for proofs for more restricted settings that moni-
toring is valuable, see Harris and Raviv, 1976, 1978, and Holmstrt5m,
1979). In addition, gains may result from the screening of projects
initiated by management and the subsequent rejection of bad projects
(Sah and Stiglitz, 1985, 1986).
5. A firm with multiple managers may exist (that is, enhance firm value)
if one manager affects another manager's output in a positive way
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), in case of mutual monitoring (Fama, 1980,
Fama and Jensen, 1983), or if managers are influenced by a common,
external source such as the state of the economy. In the latter case
the output of one manager provides information about the output of
other managers, and gains are associated with the joint evaluation of
managers (Holmstrám, 1982).
6. A similar analysis follows if other performance measures at the level
of the firm are selected such as stock market return.
7. Given the generality of the model, it provides little guidance regard-
ing the functional form of the relation between the manager's bonus
and the performance variables. Empirical implications can be derived
if some additional structure is placed on the model, e.g. if it is
assumed that the utility functions of agents belong to the power class
of utility functions.19.
8. High technology firms were defined in terms of expenditures for R~D
(above industry average), OESO-specialization coefficients, etc., see
Dijkstra (1985).
9. This homogeneity concerns e.g. the specific segment of the labour
market and the associated reservation wage (which, as I will argue
later, may also affect the size of the bonus). The group 'marketing
managers' is, however, less homogenous than it appears at first sight.
Most firms have managers that are responsible for more than one mana-
gement function. In this respect, ~5 x of the marketing managers in
the data set are also responsible for sales.
10. Our analysis is in terms of expected bonus incomes, where the data
concern ex post information. So additionally, we assume that expected
values of variables are unbiased estimates of realized values. If this
assumption is unrealistic, the empirical analysis might fail to corro-
borate the agency hypotheses even if they are valid.
11. Another potential criticism concerns the fact that ~5 X of the marke-
ting managers are also responsible for sales. In theory, the results
for marketing managers might be 'driven' by the sales function of
these managers. In itself, higher bonuses associated with sales are
consistent with the theory of the previous section. However we should
be careful in interpreting these results with respect to the marketing
function in particular.
12. Hence the bonus is a'tax gimmick': a possibly unwritten contract
between the firm and the manager intended to reap tax benefits.
13. In fact these figures concern the manager's marginal tax rate. Formula
(1) -(3) are easily extended such that the dutch tax system, where
the marginal tax rate increases with personal income, is modelled more
realistically. However since the additional realism does not change
the outcome of the analysis, this complication is avoided.
14. Table 2 shows that the average marketing manager got a bonus of f
19.600,- at the end of the period. Given neutrality in terms of firm
value, this amounts at the beginning of the period to 19.600 ~{1 t
r(1 - t)}. If t is 0.43 and r- 0.05, v is about f 19.200,-. In a
multi-périod se~ting, suppose s manager invests v, and only v, in
riskless securities. Then the total investment in bonds and accumula-
ted interest surpasses f ~2.000,- within 4 years.
15. On the other hand, in a world with transaction costs, the costs of
installing and administering a bonus plan by the firm may be smaller
than the buying of traded options or making home-made options by mana-
gers. Thus a transaction cost-hypothesis cannot a priori be excluded
as an explanation of this type of bonus plan, and hence for the higher
bonuses of marketing managers.
16. Except if payments are made under a pension plan and taxes are lower
after retirement. In practice, such payments are constrained under
dutch tax laws.20.
1~. In fact capital gains can even increase corporate taxes if the firm
sells the stock and the resulting gains are reported on the income
statement. On the other hand, if stock sales result in a capital loss,
this may decrease corporate taxes.
18. 'Cl~is will only be used after the tax exempt amount oF dividend is
exhausted (similar to interest).
19. This clientele effect can also be predicted for the US setting, since
it applies if the personal tax rate on capital gains is lower than the
personal tax rate on dividend.
20. In calculating correlation coefficients, missing data were handled by
pairwise deletion of observations. Of course the empirical models
estimated by LISREL could also have been estimated by e.g. 2SLS. How-
ever since these estimates are virtually identical, they are omitted
here.
21. Suppose that 'hours of work' is indeed biased upwards in case of mar-
keting managers due to operationalization error. This hypothesis is
tested by specifying in figure 1 a direct effect from 'type of mana-
ger' on 'hours of work' (g 1) which is then expected to be positive.
For reasons of identificat~on, b~3 is specified to be 0. ULS-estimates
turn out to be:
coefficient
bzi b3z gii gzi g31
estimate 0.48 0.40 0.38 0.1~ -0.02
Hence g is negative (-0.02). The coefficient is however insignifi-
cant (t }'-0.36), so the hypothesized operationalization error is not
corroborated by the data.
Furthermore, a reciprocal effect can be hypothesized from 'bonus' on
'total income', because total income - salary t bonus t other ele-
ments. Therefore the model just described was reestimated (without
g which was not empirically corroborated) with a two-way relation
b~~ween 'total income' and 'bonus'. ULS-estimates turn out to be:
coefficient
bzi biz b3z gii gzi
estimate 0.22 0.2~ 0.39 0.36 0.24
Both b and b (the two-way relation between 'total income' and
'bonus'~trepreseá~ substantial values and are significant. In addition
the effect from 'type of manager' on 'bonus' (g 1) increases substan-
tially, so the evidence in favour of the signa~-to-noise hypothesis
becomes even more pronounced.21.
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